May 31, 1985
AsiaWeek – Interview with Tun Mustapha Harun
For
Malaysian old enough to remember, the name Tun Mustapha Harun stirs
vivid memories of the late 1960s and early 1970s when the lean, chain
smoking, charismatic figure ruled the East Malaysian state of Sabah with
an iron hand. “Maybe I am the most criticized, most maligned man in
this part of the world,” he says with a chuckle. “(But) I tell you the
people here still love me.” The stuff of legends at 67 still draws a
crowd when he speaks and sees himself as “still young.” Says he: “I have
ten children. And maybe a few more to come.” Born in a section of Sulu
royal family that fled to Borneo about a century ago, Mustapha in 1934
joined the British North Borneo Company that owned Sabah, beginning as
an office boy in the district office in Kudat. When Sabah became a
British Colony after the war, Mustapha was already the paramount chief
of the Muslims in the Kudat area. In 1955 he was appointed to the
colony’s legislative and executive councils making his entry into
politics. Last week Mustapha granted a rare interview. In the Kota
Kinabalu office of the Muslim Welfare Organisation that he heads, lie
talked to Asiaweek’s Assif Shameen for two hours about the past and
present. Excerpts:
In
1963 Mustapha was appointed Governor of Sabah when the British colony
joined the Federation of Malaysia. Only a year before, Mustapha had
formed the United Sabah National Organisation but the role of Chief
Minister went to Donald Stephens, a charismatic Kadazan leader. Mustapha
and Stephens soon became sworn enemies and Mustapha was accused of
interfering in state politics when his role was merely constitutional
head.
“I
was Governor for 18 months. It was really terrible. I felt like a big
bird in a small cage. I couldn’t do anything. Stephens would never
listen to me. He thought as he was Chief Minister he had a licence to do
anything. I told him as Governor I too had some powers. We clashed a
few times but it all came out in the open towards the end of 1964 when
he presented me with a text of the policy speech that I was to deliver
at the assembly. The clash was about how the administration should work.
The text of speech was very inadequate and I told him to go away and
make amends. He told me that Governors was only supposed to read the
speeches prepared by the Chief Minister. I told him the Governor had
every right to make changes. So the next day I stood up at the Assembly
and read out a different speech. I had added new paragraphs and
discarded some of Stephens’ text. He was horrified and complained to
Tunku Abdul Rahman. In my speech I stressed multiracialism and improving
the standard of life and educating the rural people. When Tunku heard
my side of the story he said Mustapha is right. Rural development is
important and we must have balance because there are so many races in
Sabah”.
In
early 1965 Mustapha resigned as Governor saying he couldn’t work with
Stephens. Soon after his resignation was accepted the Tunku asked
Stephens to join the federal government as minister for Sabah Affair. In
August 1965 Singapore was ousted from the Malaysian Federation and
Stephens, a close friend of Lee Kwan Yew, resigned his ministerial post.
Mustapha was invited to replace him.
“I
join the Federal Government on the persuasion of Tunku. He tried for
three days and at the end of every day I used to tell him ‘I don’t want
to be a minister in the Federal Government.’ I don’t know why I took it
but I realized that there were going to be elections in Sabah soon and
my eyes were on the State Government. I reorganized USNO and the same
time Stephens was busy reorganizing his party, UPKO [United
Pasok-Momogun Kadazan Organisation]. In the 1967 elections, UPKO won 12
seats, USNO 14 and the balance was with Sabah Chinese Association which
had 5 seats. There was one Chinese independent. I got the SCA to join
hands with USNO so I became Chief Minister in 1967. In the late 60s
there were no major political problems in Sabah. Stephens left politics,
dissolved UPKO and merged it with USNO. Our relations with the Federal
Government were very good. Tunku was the closest friend I had”.
But
soon after Tunku stepped down as Prime Minister, Mustapha began to have
problem with the Federal Government which thought he was increasingly
charting an independent course for Sabah. His battles with Premier Tun
Abdul Razak and Deputy Premier Tun Dr Ismail are legendary.
“I
had nothing personal against Tun Razak or Dr Ismail. It was always on
policy matters. One big clash I had with Razak was over foreign policy.
He thought as Sabah Chief Minister I had no right to interfere in
foreign affairs. I was saying this is federation. Everyone has say in
the running of foreign affairs. In 1973 he began to make statements that
he wanted to normalize relations with China. I am an anti-communist.
But
I have nothing against the Russian people or the Chinese people. I just
don’t like their system, that’s all. All my life has been spent in a
free system. So when Tun Razak started talking about normalizing
relations with China I flew to Kuala Lumpur, I said to him ‘Tun, are you
crazy? How can we have good ties with the bloody communist?’ At that
time even the U.S didn’t recognize China. I asked Razak why Malaysia
should have relations with China. He said to me there were four
objectives he wanted to accomplish on his China trip. One, he wanted
China to persuade the communist guerilla in the jungle and the border to
scale down or stop the war against Malaysian forces. Two, he wanted
China to support the region to be neutralized. Three, he was planning
elections in 1974 and didn’t want a repetition of 1969 when the Chinese
voters deserted the alliance and voted for the opposition. Four, he
wanted Chinese support for the Straits of Malacca to become territorial
water.
I
told him he’d be lucky if Mao or Chau En-lai would agree to even
consider one concession he wanted from them. I told him I know the
mentality of communist leaders. In the end I was proven right. As far as
the Chinese voters are concerned, I told him there is nothing to worry
about as long as they are in a minority. If Chinese are smaller in
number there is nothing they can do politically. But Razak would not
listen. He kept saying ‘Mustapha, you don’t understand foreign policy.’ I
told him ‘Yes, I do understand. It is you, Tun, who don’t appreciate my
point.’ So we clashed and quarreled.
The
clashes between the two men led to a point of no return and Razak
wanted Mustapha removed from his position. He offered Mustapha
appointment in Kuala Lumpur as Defence Minister but Mustapha turned it
down. In mid-1974 Razak began wooing Mustapha again.
“I
knew all along he wanted me out of Sabah. He told me that he was
offering me the Defence Minister because he wanted to consolidate power
in Kuala Lumpur. I was like a brother to him. Despite our differences on
policy we are good friend. Financial, material, moral, whatever support
he needed, I gave him. He used to call me ‘Mustapha, I want this.’ I
would say ‘Right, OK’.
When
Razak insisted that I join the Federal as Defence Minister I said, I
will on one condition: I have a free hand in running the ministry and
strengthening the county’s defence by beefing up our arsenal with new
sophisticated equipment. I took leave as chief minister and appointed my
deputy as acting CM and went to Kuala Lumpur to prepare a working paper
with the help of Gen. Mahmood Suleiman and a few others. Day and night
the committee sat discussing what equipment should be bought from where.
When Razak saw the working paper he said ‘Wow, this is very good. Now
our defence will be very strong. But later he turned around and said,
‘This thing going to cost us a fortune, Mustapha. Where are we going to
get all the money?’ I told him, ‘You just say you agree with the
proposal. I will get the money.’ So I went to Ghaddafi in Libya and King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia. It was 1975, Vietnam and Cambodia were falling
to communist. Thailand and Malaysia were next. Gaddafi said, ‘Ye, we
must have a strong Muslim nation in Southeast Asia.’ King Faisal was
also very receptive to my idea. He said to me, ‘Go, buy the arms. Don’t
worry about the repayment. If Malaysia has a fortune one day it can pay
back Saudi Arabia. If not, never mind, I’ll share my money for the
defence of my Muslim brother.’ You know I had 10 billion [Malaysian
money] in pledges from Ghaddafi and King Faisal and some others. King
Faisal said to me he would never allow a Muslim country like Malaysia to
fall to communist”
Once
he had the pledges, Mustapha, officially still Sabah’s chief minister,
flew around the globe wrapping arms deals, much to the chagrin of
Premier Razak and others in federal government who suspected that
Mustapha’s main objective was to collect commissions.
“I
approached the Malaysian ambassador in Paris to ask the France defence
minister whether he could have 25 Mirage fighters. I went to Washington
to look for a big aircraft carrier. I told the British defence secretary
that we were interested in 25 Phantom jet fighters. We were also in
touch with the German to purchase a destroyer and some submarines. I was
doing all these because I didn’t want to take over as defence minister
of a weak nation. Once we had all this equipment, I told Razak, I will
resign from Sabah and become defence minister. But before the plan could
be finally approved Razak called me and said that he had been thinking
about the whole thing. I said to him, ‘What is there to think about?,
Ghaddafi is willing, Faisal says money no problem. If we have the money,
why don’t we buy?’ But Razak said to me, ‘You don’t understand foreign
policy. If we strengthen our defences our neighbor will be suspicious.
China and Russia will be angry. There might be a war.’ I said, ‘Rubbish.
The communist guerillas have been fighting a war with us for 30 years.’
I told him, when we have the arms we would have nobody to fear except
god. But Razak said no. So I turned down the request to become defence
minister. I wasn’t doing anything for money. It was Razak’s idea to make
me defence. I tell you I have enough money without doing hanky-panky.”
Mustapha
bitterest dispute with Razak and other federal leaders was over the
formation of Barisan Nasional, an expanded coalition that would include
winning parties from all states besides all the Alliance members UMNO,
MCA and MIC. Mustapha thought it was another plan to clip his wings and
federal leaders saw his reluctance as further proof that he wasn’t
interested in national integration and harmony.
“The
Barisan Nasional was a modified plan. The original idea of Tun Razak
and Dr Ismail was to have one party system Razak told me one day. I
think it was 1973, that after what happened in the 1969 general
elections and the subsequent riots, he had concluded that a multi-party
system was not for Malaysia. I said to him, ‘Tun, we have a democratic
system. We can’t had our system with this one-party plan.’ Then he told
me the plan was to merge UMNO, MCA, MIC and the rest. He said, ‘USNO
will also have to merge.’ I told him there was no way USNO will merge
with anybody. In a multiracial society every community must have its
say. In a federation every State must have its say. He kept saying we
had the system in 1969 and look what happened. Later he modified his
plan and appointed Ghafar Baba to draft a constitution for Barisan. I
think it was during this time he made up his mind that I should be
removed from Sabah. He was only waiting for a right time to topple me.
In 1975 BERJAYA was formed on the orders of Tun Razak. He encouraged
Harris, Stephens and the others. I was also opposed to the initial draft
of the Barisan constitution. All power was with Kuala Lumpur. It was
like dictatorship. I told Tun Razak, ‘You can’t direct everything like
the colonial office in London used to. We already have our Merdeka.’ But
he amended the constitution. They call me dictator but I tell you I did
more for democracy in Malaysia then any of the other leaders.”
As
he battled on against what he describes as federal interference.
Mustapha reopen issue after issue, much to the annoyance of Kuala
Lumpur. A key one was oil royalties.
“I
told Razak that Tunku had agreed that according to the 1963 agreement
all natural resources would be shared between federal government and
state government. In 1974 when oil prices began to move up I went to
Razak and said before we talk about other things let us talk about oil.
Offshore oil we share 50:50 with federal. Onshore we get 60, federal
takes 40 percent. Razak said no. So I negotiated. After talks which went
on for months, Razak agreed on 80:20 for both onshore and offshore, 20
percent for us, 80 percent for them. But before it could be finalized
they toppled USNO and one of the first things they did was to get
Berjaya to agree on a deal that gave them 95 percent of all oil
royalties. If Sabah could maintain 20 percent of the oil royalties it
would be a very rich state. But BERJAYA sold out on everything. They
were puppets.”
Federal
leaders and his successors in the State Government called Mustapha’s
administration autocratic and dictatorial. Books on Sabah’s contemporary
history describe his government as being plagued corruption and
economic mismanagement.
“Those
who accuse me of being autocratic and dictatorial are the ones
committed misdeeds themselves. I was only a scapegoat. I don’t care what
people say or write about me. It doesn’t matter. I got 16 seats and
came very close to getting another five. After what they wrote and said
about me you would think I couldn’t win a seat.
But
people are not fools. I ruled by consensus but Harris ruled by brute
force. He was a minister in my cabinet but resigned to start his own
business and bought a 10,000 acres rubber plantation. He chopped all the
trees down, planted it with tapioca. I said to him, ‘Harris, you’re
mad. Why cut these trees? But he said tapioca will make more money than
rubber.
He
said he could sell to Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong. He invited me to
inaugurate his factory. After a few months he was bankrupt so he came
crying to me. ‘Tun, please help me.’ So I gave him some timber land to
cover his outstanding loans with the bank. I got the state land
development authority to take over his plantation. He was over extended.
I had to keep helping and he kept coming back. Ungrateful.
Harris
says that I was a dictator. You can refer to minutes of cabinet
meetings of USNO supreme council. It should be all there unless they
have burnt them. There were discussions and then consensus. In the party
there was democracy. I welcome suggestions.
But
sometimes in the party and the cabinet they said ‘No, Tun, you decide.
We leave it to you.’ They wanted me to get the impression that they were
very loyal to me. I didn’t know it then but I now realize what they
were doing. They all wanted to make me happy so that I will give them
timber land or some contract. But this is not dictatorship. Under Harris
there was no democracy. He forced his decision on people. Before
anybody could speak he used to say ‘I have decided that…’ In the party
everything was engineered. He used to tell people, you stand for this
post, you stand for that, you nominate this man, I’ll get you nominated
by that man. If I was a dictator and autocrat you have to find another
word for Harris, much worse.
I
admit many of my ministers were corrupted. Many close friends were also
corrupt. They used my name to do all sorts of hanky-panky. They knew
because I am a nice man and I don’t betray my friends, I won’t touch
them. That’s how Sabah got this bad reputation of corruption. Most of
this hanky-panky went on while I was away. I have family outside. I have
so many business interests in London, in Australia, so I have to be
away. Most of the ministers and my friends who applied for timber lands
got them while I was away. My deputy gave them all. But I have to save
his face and the face of others so I can’t do anything. Now they say
Mustapha is a bad man. He is corrupt. My mistake was I just closed my
eyes when all this was going on. Now my eyes are wide open. Under Harris
there was more corruption. It is now all coming out.”
In
1975, Mustapha angry at Kuala Lumpur’s interference and its campaign to
trim his powers, threaten to pull Sabah out of Malaysia. At one point
he even contemplated joining forces with the Sulu region in the Southern
Philippines and Sarawak. Some aides say he toyed with the idea of
becoming sultan of an expanded Sulu-Borneo state.
“I
never wanted to pull Sabah out of Malaysia. It was all lies perpetuated
by the federal government and their agents here. I even appointed a
committee to review the question of Sabah’s autonomy under the Malaysia
Federation. The committee prepared a report on the things that we were
to surrender to the federal government as the 10-year transitionary
period under the 1963 agreement was over. I did say once or twice that
we should leave Malaysia. It was more of a slip of tongue. Razak kept
testing my patience. He provoked me and in anger I said, ‘look, if this
sort of thing goes on we will take Sabah out of Malaysia.’ I remember
saying if Singapore can be independent we can go too. But it was a slip
of tongue under provocation. I was frustrated at the time. But the
federal government capitalized on it and played it up. They made me look
like a monster. But people know I am not anti-Malaysia. I have done
many for Malaysia than many of the people who criticize me. One thing I
will not stand is the colonizing of Sabah, whether it is by the federal
government or any other country. Nobody can be allowed to colonise
Sabah.
I
never wanted to merge Sabah with Sarawak or Sulu and Brunei and become
sultan. This is the sort of rubbish that has been printed before. It is
ridiculous. “Why should I want to become king or sultan? All the power
was with the Chief Minister.”
During
Mustapha’s rule the issue of the Philippines’ claim to Sabah came to
the boil. Amid growing rebellion in the southern Philippines, Mustapha
helped form the Moro National Liberation Front. With Mustapha’s help the
Muslim rebellion found Arab support.
“As
far as I am concerned there is really no claim. It was settled in 1939
by the British chartered company. There is a high court judgement to
prove that. I personally stand to benefit if the claim was valid as I am
one of the heirs of the Sulu sultan. But I know there is no claim. The
federal government I think has a clever policy on the so called claim.
They don’t ignore it altogether but they don’t entertain it either.
Maybe they want to use it against the Sabah people as a bargaining item
to make them behave. If Sabah people do anything they can say ‘Look, we
will leave you to the Philippines.’
The
story of MNLF is very straightforward. If you and I have a common
enemy, will we do anything to help him? No, we will create problems for
him. That was how MNLF came [about]. I was not the only one involved.
Ghaddafi was involved, Kuala Lumpur was involved, other Muslim countries
were involved, and so many people were involved. My role is 10 percent
or 20 percent. You look at it this way: the Philippine armed forces were
bombing the Sulu people so they came here for shelter. I helped refugee
mainly because of human consideration, not political. Later it became a
political matter. Even if I was one who created this MNLF it doesn’t
mean I was involved in the war. Libya was giving arms. Others were
giving money. I was only giving refuge to refugees. I never gave arms to
anyone. Not to MNLF, not to anybody. You say arms went through Sabah.
Well, I tell you I didn’t give permission to send them from here. Sabah
is big state. I can’t be expected to check everybody.”
Early
on April 22, Mustapha was sworn in as Sabah Chief Minister after
Pairin’s PBS won a majority in the Assembly. Mustapha says Pairin should
have been called first to form the government, but says that it’s the
governor’s prerogative to call anyone. Mustapha says he was lucky that
he was called since he didn’t have a majority. No, he intends to get
back the Chief Minister’s seat which he says is rightfully his.
“At
2 a.m. Majid Khan a close friend to Harris came to see me with USNO
leader Yahya Lampong and my son Abdul Hamid. They said [Deputy PM] Musa
had given the blessing and green light for an USNO-BERJAYA coalition. I
have no access to Musa. Even if I had how dare I have someone up at that
time to check. I asked Majid Khan, ‘How are we going to form the
government? It is USNO 16, Berjaya 6, PBS 26.’ By 2 a.m. I knew the
whole result. Majid Khan said there are six nominated seats. I told him
we must accept the will of the people. But he kept saying ‘Musa want you
to take oath, the governor is waiting. Let’s go now.’ I went to the
istana at 2.30 a.m. At about 3.30 a.m. I took the oath. Harris only
called Musa at 3.40 a.m. We told the governor that we will be back at 7
a.m. with a list of nominated members and cabinet line-up. Cabinet was
supposed to take oath at 7.30 a.m. When we came back to my house Majid
Khan insisted he wanted to be appointed one of the six nominated
members. BERJAYA would nominate 3, USNO 3. He said in cabinet it would
be 4 for BERJAYA, 4 for USNO. I said ‘You are a fool. You win six seats;
you want 4 ministers in the cabinet.’ No more discussion. Later in the
morning I called Kuala Lumpur and I was told that Musa had already told
Harris ‘no coalition with USNO.’ If not for Berjaya’s greed six members
would have been nominated and cabinet sworn in at 7.30 a.m. No way could
Pairin be sworn in. I tell you I am still the chief minister because
the letter revoking my appointment is unconstitutional.”
